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Abstract 
 
The October 2015 Polish parliamentary election saw the stunning victory of the right-wing 
opposition Law and Justice party which became the first in post-communist Poland to secure 
an outright parliamentary majority, and equally comprehensive defeat of the incumbent 
centrist Civic Platform. In addition to the fact that the outgoing ruling party could no longer 
rely on invoking the ‘politics of fear’, the main factor accounting for this was widespread 
disillusionment with the country’s ruling elite. The election also saw the broad ‘post-
transition’ socio-demographic and ideological divide and Law and Justice-Civic Platform 
duopoly continuing to dominate party competition. However, there were some indications of 
greater party system fluidity and question marks over who would emerge as the main 
representative of the anti-Law and Justice side of this divide. 
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The Polish parliamentary election held on October 25th 2015, the eighth since the emergence 
of multi-party politics in 1989, saw the stunning victory of the right-wing Law and Justice 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS) party, the main opposition grouping which became the first in 
post-communist Poland to secure an outright parliamentary majority, and equally 
comprehensive defeat of the centrist Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska: PO), the 
country’s ruling party since 2007. The election also the emergence of two new entrants into 
parliament: the ‘anti-system’ right-wing Kukiz ’15 grouping and liberal ‘Modern’ 
(Nowoczesna) party. While the agrarian Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: 
PSL), Civic Platform’s junior coalition partner, scraped over the threshold for parliamentary 
representation, this was also the first post-1989 election when no left-wing parties were 
elected to the legislature. 
 
This paper seeks to explain the election outcome and examine what it means for the future of 
the Polish party system. It begins by setting out the background to the election, surveying the 
main developments in party politics during the 2011-15 parliament. Section two examines the 
election campaign before section three moves on to analyse the results. Finally, section four 
looks at what lessons can be drawn from the election about the long-term trajectory of Polish 
politics, particularly whether or not the party system is becoming more fluid and unstable 
following a period of apparent consolidation around the two large electoral blocs which 
formed the basis for what might be termed the ‘post-transition’ divide?  
 
The paper argues that, in addition to the fact that Civic Platform could no longer rely on its 
previously highly successful strategy of mobilising passive anti-Law and Justice voters 
through invoking the ‘politics of fear’, the main factor accounting for the opposition’s 
stunning victory was widespread disillusionment with the country’s political establishment 
and ruling elite. The election saw the broad ‘post-transition’ divide and the Law and Justice-
Civic Platform duopoly continuing to dominate party competition and structure the party 
system in terms of the ideological and cultural divisions and socio-demographic 
constituencies that the two sides represented. However, there were also indications that the 
election could herald long-term changes in the Polish party system, and question marks over 
who would emerge as the main representative of the anti-Law and Justice side of this divide. 
 
Polish party development in the 2001-15 parliament 
 
The September/October 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections1 saw the collapse of 
the so-called ‘post-communist divide’ between the ex-communist and post-Solidarity 
                                                          
1 For more on the 2005 elections, see: Radosław Markowski, ‘The Polish Elections of 2005: Pure Chaos or a 
Restructuring of the Party System?’ West European Politics, Vol 29 No 4, September 2006, pp814-832; Frances 
Millard, ‘Poland’s politics and the travails of transition after 2001,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol 58 No 7, 
November 2006, pp1007-1031; and Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘”Social Poland Defeats “Liberal Poland”?: The 
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electoral blocs that had dominated and appeared to provide structural order to the Polish party 
system during the 1990s.2 This was exemplified by the slump in support for the communist 
successor Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej: SLD), following the 
earlier the implosion of the right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza 
Solidarność: AWS) electoral alliance in the 2001 parliamentary election.3 Since then, Poland 
appeared to show signs of increasing party system stabilisation around the duopoly 
comprising Civic Platform and Law and Justice; the two post-Solidarity parties which 
emerged victorious in 2005 and formed the basis of what might be termed the ‘post-transition 
divide’. This bi-polar divide not only endured but strengthened and went on to structure and 
dominate Polish politics over the next decade. The consolidation of the party system around it 
could be seen in the increasing share of the vote won by these two parties and, as discussed 
below, declining levels of electoral volatility. As Table 1 shows, the combined share of the 
vote (and seats) won by the two largest parties increased from 51.13% (and 62.6% of seats) in 
2005 to 73.62% (81.52% of seats) in 2007 and remained high at 69.07% (79.13% of seats) in 
2011. 
 
Table 1: Party fragmentation in post-1989 Poland 
 
 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 2011 2015 
Number of parties elected 
to the Sejm 
29 6 5 6 6 4 5 5 
Share of votes won by two 
largest parties (%) 
24.31 35.81 60.96 53.72 51.13 73.62 69.07 61.67 
Share of seats won by two 
largest parties (%) 
25.52 65.87 79.35 61.09 62.60 81.52 79.13 81.09 
Source: Radosław Markowski and Mikołaj Cześnik, ‘Polski system partyjny: dekada zmian instytucjonalnych i 
ich konsekwencje,’ in Radosław Markowski, ed. System Partyjny i Zachowanie Wyborcze: Dekada Polskich 
Doświadczeń. Warsaw: ISP PAN. 2002, pp.17-47 (20); and author’s calculations. 
 
In the October 2011 parliamentary election Civic Platform, led by prime minister Donald 
Tusk, became the first incumbent party since the collapse of communism in 1989 to be re-
elected for a second consecutive term.4 However, the party was to find its second term much 
more problematic following a series of crises that seriously dented its carefully cultivated 
image as more competent, knowledgeable and professional than its political opponents. 
During its first term the Tusk government was often criticized for failing to undertake more 
decisive, but potentially unpopular, fiscal and structural measures. However, the re-elected 
Civic Platform administration was forced by financial markets, credit rating agencies and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
September-October 2005 Polish Parliamentary and Presidential Elections’, Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transitional Politics, Vol 23 No 2, June 2007, pp203-232. 
2 See: Mirosława Grabowska. Podział postkomunistyczny: Społeczne podstawy polityki w Polsce po 1989 roku. 
Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. 2004. 
3  See: Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Poland’s Unexpected Political Earthquake: The September 2001 Parliamentary 
Election,’ Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. Vol 18 No 3, September 2002, pp41-76; and 
Frances Millard, ‘Elections in Poland 2001: electoral manipulation and party upheaval,’ Communist and Post-
Communist Studies. Vol 36 No 1, March 2003, pp69-86. 
4  See: Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Poland (Mainly) Chooses Stability and Continuity: The October 2011 Polish 
Parliamentary Election’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol 14 No 4, December 2013, pp480-
504. 
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EU to promise a more decisive long-term reform programme.5 In particular, the government 
pushed through a highly controversial reform of the pension system increasing the retirement 
age to 67, from the previous level of 65 for men and 60 for women, that was opposed by 80-
90% of the public.6 This, in turn, made the Tusk administration extremely wary of pushing 
ahead with other radical reforms,7 particularly any which affected the agricultural sector, 
fearing that this could damage public support and create tensions with its coalition partner.  
 
The Peasant Party was an unusually loyal governing partner and, in spite of the inevitable 
occasional tensions and strains, the coalition was much more cohesive and stable than any of 
its predecessors. The party appeared to have drawn lessons from earlier periods as a member 
of coalition governments during the 1990s and early 2000s when it often distanced itself from 
the main ruling party whenever its poll ratings declined or the government encountered 
difficulties. In its coalition with Civic Platform, on the other hand, the party pursued a very 
different strategy: while occasionally signalling its independence and disagreement with 
certain government policies, when it came to actual voting in parliament it invariably 
supported Civic Platform’s plans, making a virtue of its predictability and self-consciously 
projecting itself as a constructive and moderating force.8 A change of leadership at the end of 
2012 - when, promising to broaden the party’s base of support beyond its rural-agricultural 
core, challenger Janusz Piechociński narrowly defeated incumbent Waldemar Pawlak,9 and 
then took over from him as deputy prime minister and economy minister - did not really 
change the dynamics between the two governing parties; other than the fact that the new 
leader was perceived by some to be less effective than his predecessor.10 
 
Civic Platform was also weakened by a series of scandals involving allegations of cronyism 
and lack of competence, together with a growing sense of government exhaustion and drift 
with ministers appearing to spend too much of their time on crisis management. Moreover, 
with the economy sluggish and unemployment remaining high Poles became increasingly 
gloomy about their future prospects. The government’s policy of introducing reforms by 
‘small steps’, which critics referred to dismissively as ‘the politics of warm water in the taps’, 
had worked fairly well while the economy was performing strongly but began to come 
unstuck when the tempo of growth slowed. As a consequence, support for Civic Platform and 
the approval ratings of both the government and Mr Tusk, who was previously one of the 
party’s most important electoral assets, slumped to their lowest levels since it took office.11 
 
At the same time, divisions and tensions within the ruling party both contributed to and were 
exacerbated by the sense of crisis, reaching a peak in summer 2013 when Mr Tusk was 
challenged for the leadership by Jarosław Gowin, a leading figure from the party’s socially 
conservative wing. The prime minister had sacked Mr Gowin as justice minister in April 
2013 after they fell out over same-sex civil partnerships and in-vitro fertilisation, although his 
                                                          
5 See: Paweł Jabłoński, ‘Ratingowy dyktat dla premiera’, Uważam Rze, 30 January-5 February 2012. 
6 See: CBOS. Opinie o zmianach w systemie emerytalnym. CBOS: Warsaw. June 2012. 
7 See: Igor Janke, ‘Bardzo mała stabilizacja’, Rzeczpospolita, 14 March 2012. 
8 See: Janina Paradowska, ‘Tańce ludowe’, Polityka, 15-21 February 2012. 
9 See: Krystyna Naszkowska, ‘PSL zaskoczył wszytkich. Piechociński zmieni ludowców’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 
November 2012. 
10 See: Kamila Baranowska, ‘Pogubiony Janusz, przyczajony Waldek’, Do Rzeczy, 12-18 August 2013. 
11 For analysis of Civic Platform’s difficulties see: Mariusz Janicki, ‘Lanie ciepłej wody’, Polityka, 8-14 May 
2013; Renata Grochal, ‘Spektakularny zjazd Tuska. Premier, który tak zręcznie uwodził Polaków, zaczął 
irytować?’ Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 May 2013; Bronisław Wildstein, ‘Cy PO przetrwa wybory?’ Do Rzeczy, 2-8 
September 2013; and Eliza Olczyk, ‘Wszytkie grzechy partii władzy’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 November 2013. 
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leadership challenge focused primarily on economic issues claiming that Mr Tusk had 
abandoned the party’s original free market ideals. Mr Gowin secured a significantly better 
than expected result (20% of the votes) and in December 2013 launched a new political 
grouping, Poland Together (Polska Razem: PR), which claimed to be returning to Civic 
Platform’s economically liberal and socially conservative roots.12 As discussed below, under 
Mr Tusk’s leadership, Civic Platform turned from being a centre-right liberal-conservative 
party into an ideologically eclectic centrist grouping which some critics dubbed a values-free 
‘post-political party of power’.  
 
For its part, immediately after the 2011 election Law and Justice - the main opposition 
grouping led by Mr Tusk’s predecessor as prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński, which 
governed Poland between 2005-7 - found itself embroiled in a bitter struggle to retain the 
loyalty of its core electorate against ‘Solidaristic Poland’ (Solidarna Polska: SP), a breakaway 
grouping led by former party deputy chairman Zbigniew Ziobro.13 However, although Mr 
Ziobro was, after Mr Kaczyński himself, probably the best-known and most popular 
politician among right-wing voters it soon became clear that Solidaristic Poland would not 
emerge as a serious challenger. At the same time, the ongoing sense of government crisis 
opened up a window of opportunity for Law and Justice, which gauged accurately that the 
public was looking for more decisive political action to alleviate the poor economic situation. 
Having seen off the challenge on its right flank, the party capitalised on the increasing 
unpopularity of the Tusk administration and landed some heavy blows by simply but 
effectively criticising its apparent failures and focusing its core message onto ‘bread and 
butter’ socio-economic issues.14 Mr Kaczyński’s party had previously made several efforts to 
tone down its more aggressive and confrontational rhetoric and downplay its signature issues 
of corruption and reform of the Polish state. The latter were part of the so-called ‘Fourth 
Republic’ project, a radical critique of post-1989 Poland as corrupt and requiring far-reaching 
moral and political reform, which came to be associated with the controversial 2005-7 Law 
and Justice governments.15  
 
However, the party invariably ended up returning to the confrontational tone that appeared to 
come more naturally to Mr Kaczyński, particularly when it seemed to countenance 
assassination as a possible cause of the April 2010 Smoleńsk tragedy. This was a plane crash 
in which the then Law and Justice-backed Polish President Lech Kaczyński, Jarosław’s twin 
brother, and 95 others were killed while on their way to commemorate the 1940 Soviet 
massacre of Polish officers in the Katyń forest in western Russia. While the Smoleńsk issue 
became an effective means for Law and Justice to build strong emotional links with and 
mobilise its core supporters, putting it at forefront of political debate often made the party 
                                                          
12 See: Piotr Zaremba, ‘Gowin - Gracz czy wisienka na torcie?’ W Sieci, 2-8 September 2013; and Dominika 
Wielowiejska, ‘Green-PiS Gowina, Wiplera i Kowala’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 December 2013. 
13 See: Janina Paradowska, ‘Ziobryści czekają mówiąc’, Polityka, 21-27 March 2012 
14 See, for example: Mirosław Czech, ‘Obietnice Kaczyńskiego’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 28 May 2013; and Piotr 
Zaremba, ‘New Deal Kaczyńskiego’, W Sieci, 24 February-2 March 2014. 
15 The concept was first developed by political scientist Rafał Matja in a niche conservative journal at the end of 
the 1990s, although it actually came to prominence in public discourse when used by the Civic Platform-linked 
sociologist (and future parliamentary deputy) Paweł Śpiewak. See: Rafał Matyja, ‘Obóz Czwartej 
Rzeczypospolitej’, Debata, 1998, No 3; and Paweł Śpiewak, ‘Koniec złudzień’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 January 
2003. 
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appear obsessive and extreme, alienating more centrist voters and distracting potential 
supporters from the party’s critique of the Tusk-led government’s other shortcomings.16 
 
In fact, although from mid-2013 onwards Law and Justice started to open up an opinion poll 
lead of around 5-10%, figures released towards the end of that year suggested that the Polish 
economy was re-bounding faster than expected. Moreover, the ruling party experienced a 
brief comeback following the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2014. Mr Tusk 
portrayed his government as playing a key role in determining the international response to 
the crisis, as a consequence of which Civic Platform finished narrowly ahead in the May 
2014 European Parliament (EP) election with 32.1% to 31.8% for Law and Justice. 17 
However, this came to an abrupt halt in June 2014 when the ruling party was hit by its most 
serious political scandal following the outbreak of the so-called ‘tape affair’.18 The weekly 
news magazine ‘Wprost’ published secret tape recordings of private meetings involving 
government ministers, including the interior and foreign ministers, and other prominent 
public figures such as the head of the National Bank of Poland. Although they did not appear 
to reveal any illegal actions, the transcripts drew popular anger at the crude language used by 
public figures and cynicism while discussing state matters over expensive meals in high-end 
Warsaw restaurants at the taxpayers’ expense. Following the outbreak of the scandal, Law 
and Justice once again opened up an opinion poll lead of more than 10% and signed a wide-
ranging co-operation agreement with Solidaristic Poland and Poland Together hoping to 
avoid a repeat of the EP election when the two small right-wing parties syphoned off voters 
and narrowly deprived Mr Kaczyński’s grouping of victory.19 
 
The political situation was once again transformed in August 2014 when Mr Tusk was 
elected President of the EU Council. Civic Platform was able to present this as a great 
success to a public which was still overwhelmingly pro-EU and proud of the appointment of 
Poles to any senior European posts, however symbolic. At the same time, Mr Tusk was 
succeeded as prime minister and acting Civic Platform leader by Ewa Kopacz, the speaker of 
the Sejm, the more powerful lower chamber of the Polish parliament. Although Mrs Kopacz 
lacked her predecessor’s gravitas and charisma, Civic Platform strategists took full advantage 
of the fact that she was relatively unknown to most voters (in spite of holding the second 
most senior state office and having been health minister between 2007-11) to ‘re-invent’ her. 
Mrs Kopacz claimed to offer pragmatism and practical solutions to people’s everyday 
problems in place of ideological divisions,20 while Law and Justice struggled to adjust its 
strategy and message given that, for a long time, it had argued that Mr Tusk personified the 
shortcomings and pathologies of the Civic Platform administration.21 The combined effects of 
                                                          
16 See, for example: Piotr Zaremba, ‘Nikcemna ulga Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 7-9 April 2012; and Cezary 
Michalski, ‘Triumf i schyłek religii smoleńskiej’, Polityka, 9-15 April 2014. 
17  See: PKW. Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego: zarządzona na dzien 25 maja 2014r. 
http://pe2014.pkw.gov.pl/pl/ (accessed 8 June 2014). 
18 See: Piotr Skwieciński, ‘Czy Tusk zaliże rany?’ W Sieci, 30 June-6 July 2014; and Bronisław Wildstein, ‘III 
RP, czyli degeneracja’, Do Rzeczy, 14-20 July 2014. 
19 See: Agata Kodzińska, ‘Ziobro i Gowin na skrzydłach u Kaczyńskiego. Wiemy, co obiecał im prezes’, Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 19 July 2014. 
20 See: Kamila Baranowska and Wojciech Wybranowski, ‘Jak zrobić premiera’, Do Rzeczy, 13-19 October 2014; 
and Renata Grochal, ‘Zmiana warty w Platformie. Jaka będzie partia Kopacz’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 November 
2014. 
21 See: Wojciech Szacki, ‘Znikający cel’, Polityka, 10-16 September 2014; and Piotr Semka, ‘PiS ma zgryz’, Do 
Rzeczy, 6-12 October 2014.  
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Mr Tusk’s appointment and Mrs Kopacz’s ‘new opening’ gave Civic Platform a popularity 
boost which appeared to wipe out the damage inflicted by the ‘tape affair’.22  
 
In the November 2014 local elections Civic Platform actually won the largest number of seats 
and retained control of 15 out of 16 regional assemblies due largely to Law and Justice’s lack 
of coalition potential and the unexpectedly high vote for the Peasant Party, which secured a 
stunning 23.7% its best ever result in a post-1989 poll.23 However, it was Law and Justice 
that finished ahead in the overall share of regional vote (albeit extremely narrowly by 26.7% 
to 26.4%), the only local government tier where elections were fought on party lines, 
providing the party with its first, symbolically important victory in a nationally contested 
election following seven successive defeats in local, parliamentary, presidential and European 
polls since 2005. Moreover, the regional elections were over-shadowed by allegations that: 
the results were unreliable given large numbers of invalid ballot papers 24  and major 
discrepancies with exit poll findings that over-estimated Law and Justice’s vote share by 
nearly 5% and under-estimated the Peasant Party’s by almost 7%, the largest ever divergence 
recorded in a Polish election.25 
 
The biggest game changer, however, was the May 2015 presidential election. The Civic 
Platform-backed incumbent Bronisław Komorowski was extremely popular, starting the 
campaign with personal and job approval ratings of over 70%, 26  and appeared odds-on 
favourite to secure re-election, possibly even in the first round of voting (a second round run-
off was required if no candidate secured more than 50%). A key element of the ruling party’s 
electoral strategy was, therefore, to use Mr Komorowski’s widely-anticipated resounding 
victory to create a wave of popular enthusiasm that would carry Civic Platform through to the 
autumn parliamentary election. However, Mr Komorowski saw his poll ratings slide during 
the course of a weak and complacent campaign that appeared to be based on the assumption 
that his popularity would translate automatically into electoral support and, in one of the 
biggest electoral upsets in post-communist Polish politics, was defeated by Law and Justice 
candidate Andrzej Duda by 51.6% to 48.5%.27  
 
The campaign 
 
Mr Duda’s victory and Mr Komorowski’s shock defeat dealt a massive blow to Civic 
Platform, leaving its electoral strategy in tatters and, given the relatively short gap between 
the two elections, changed the dynamics of the parliamentary poll as Law and Justice pulled 
ahead by around 10%. Civic Platform’s response involved Mrs Kopacz trying to convince 
                                                          
22 See: Piotr Skwieciński, ‘Polityka w emocjonalnej flaucie’, W Sieci, 13-19 October 2014. 
23 See: Paweł Majewski, ‘Rewolucja w polskiej polityce, ale wszytko zostaje po staremu’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 
November 2014. 
24 A record 17.9% of the votes cast were declared invalid; in previous regional polls the numbers ranged 
between 12.1%-14.4%. See: Marcin Pieńkowski, ‘Polacy nie potrafią stawiać krzyżyków? Drastyczny wzrost 
nieważnych głosów’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 November 2014. 
25 See: Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Poland’s disputed local election results have raised questions about the reliability of 
the Polish electoral process’, LSE EUROPP blog, 3 December 2014, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/12/03/polands-disputed-local-election-results-have-raised-questions-
about-the-reliability-of-the-polish-electoral-process/ (accessed 4 December 2014). 
26 See: CBOS. Oceny instytucji publicznych. CBOS: Warsaw. February 2015, p3; and CBOS. Zaufania do 
polityków w lutym. CBOS: Warsaw. February 2015, p3. 
27  See:  PKW. Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015. 
http://prezydent2015.pkw.gov.pl/325_Wyniki_Polska (accessed 1 June 2015). 
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voters that she was in touch with their concerns, launching a government roadshow with 
mobile cabinet meetings held in Poland’s provincial cities. 28  While these appeared 
unconventional (sometimes even comical) they did at least give the impression of an active 
prime minister trying to engage with the public, and surveys suggested that Mrs Kopacz was 
personally quite popular with Poles admiring her determination and resilience.29 Moreover, 
conscious of the need to avoid coming across as resting on its laurels, Civic Platform argued 
that it was time for ordinary Poles to benefit more directly from the country’s economic 
success and see a visible improvement in their living standards. The centrepiece of this new 
approach was an apparently radical overhaul of the income tax and social security system that 
involved scrapping separate social security and health premiums and introducing new unified 
personal taxes, ranging from 10% for the poorest families to 39.5% for the wealthiest.30 
However, the tax reform plan was presented in a rather vague and incoherent way and lacked 
credibility given that many voters saw Civic Platform’s record in office as being 
characterised by programmatic timidity.31  
 
Another important element of Civic Platform’s campaign strategy was trying to mobilise 
passive anti-Law and Justice voters by generating fear of an opposition victory. Invoking the 
‘politics of fear’ - and portraying itself as the most effective bulwark against an allegedly 
confrontational and authoritarian style of politics that many voters, rightly or wrongly, 
associated with Law and Justice and its combative leader - had been a staple of all Civic 
Platform’s successful election campaigns and large sections of the ruling party became used 
to the idea that they could win elections by simply tapping into this sentiment. This could be 
seen in Civic Platform’s attempts to repeat its previous manoeuvre of inviting politicians 
from rival political groupings to join its candidate lists, with prominent political ‘transfers’ 
this time including: Ludwik Dorn, interior minister and deputy prime minister in the 2005-7 
Law and Justice-led governments, and former Democratic Left Alliance leader Grzegorz 
Napieralski.32  
 
However, for various reasons Civic Platform’s anti-Law and Justice message was not as 
effective this time around, particularly among a younger generation of voters who had no 
(positive or negative) memories of the 2005-7 governments. Firstly, Law and Justice made a 
conscious effort to ‘de-toxify’ its image, by giving a higher profile to less well-known, 
second-rank politicians likely to appeal to centrist voters; for example, making the party’s 
emollient deputy leader Beata Szydło (who was Mr Duda’s campaign manager) its prime 
ministerial nominee rather than Mr Kaczyński. 33  The Law and Justice leader had an 
extremely dedicated following among the party’s core supporters but was a polarising figure 
and one of the country’s least trusted politicians. Secondly, as part of a programme of what it 
termed ‘good change’ (‘dobra zmiana’), Law and Justice set out a series of attractive (if 
potentially very costly) pledges to: reverse the Civic Platform government’s deeply 
unpopular decision to increase the retirement age; introduce additional child benefits for 
poorer and larger families; and raise tax-free income thresholds.34 In doing so, it tapped into 
                                                          
28  See: Michał Szułdrzyński, ‘Kopacz minimalizuje straty’, Rzeczpospolita, 21 July 2015; and Barbara 
Fedyszak-Radziejowska, ‘Platformy gra w podróbki’, W Sieci, 31 August-6 Sepember 2015. 
29 See: Renata Grochal, ‘Premier się stara, a Platforma śpi’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 September 2015. 
30 See: Renata Grochal, ‘Ratunkowy plan PO’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 September 2014. 
31 See: Michał Szułdrzyński, ‘Spóźniona rewolucja Platformy’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 September 2015; and Renata 
Grochal, ‘Platforma chce skierować kampanie w stronę gospodarki’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 September 2014. 
32 See: Renata Grochal, ‘Wyliniałe listy to za mało, by pokonać PiS’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 September 2015. 
33 See: Kamila Baranowska, ‘Fenomenon Szydło’, Do Rzeczy, 12-18 October 2015. 
34 See: Ania Dąbrowska, ‘Prezes listy pisze’, Polityka, 2-9 September 2015. 
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the fact that many Poles living beyond the large urban centres, especially younger voters, 
were frustrated not to have seen a more substantial increase in their living standards in recent 
years, even as the country’s economy grew;35  paradoxically, at a time when most Poles 
appeared optimistic about their personal economic prospects. 36  Thirdly, Civic Platform 
undermined its anti-Law and Justice message by recruiting a number of prominent 
individuals who were closely associated with the ‘Fourth Republic’ project (such as Mr 
Dorn) to stand on to its candidate lists.37 
 
Civic Platform also found itself on the defensive because of widespread disillusionment with 
the country’s political establishment and a strong prevailing mood that it was time for 
change.38 For example, a June 2015 CBOS survey found that 72% of respondents were 
dissatisfied with Poland’s political system compared with 23% who were satisfied (and only 
1% very satisfied). 39  A key element of this was scepticism towards the outgoing 
government’s triumphalist rhetoric about its apparent achievements and the broader success 
of post-communist transition. This was particularly the case with younger voters, many of 
whom were increasingly disillusioned by what they saw as an invidious choice between: 
moving abroad to take jobs that fell well short of their abilities, or remaining in a country 
which offered them few prospects for the future.40 This anti-establishment feeling was one of 
the leitmotifs of the election campaign and much of it was directed towards Civic Platform, 
whom many voters saw as representing an out-of-touch and complacent elite disconnected 
from the concerns of ordinary people and tainted by scandals.41 Civic Platform was lulled 
into a false sense of security following Mr Tusk’s unexpected election as EU Council 
President which, together with Mrs Kopacz’s appointment, appeared to wipe out the damage 
inflicted by the ‘tape affair’. However, it came back to haunt the party during the election 
campaign when controversial businessman and anti-establishment activist Zbigniew Stonoga 
published thousands of pages of classified documents from the ongoing public prosecutor’s 
investigation into the scandal. This forced Mrs Kopacz to engage in an extraordinary political 
purge forcing the resignations of the treasury, health and sports ministers together with three 
deputy ministers and other senior officials including the speaker of the Sejm, her chief policy 
adviser, and the co-ordinator of the state security services;42 but which many, increasingly 
cynical, voters dismissed as panicky and inauthentic. 
 
Another key element of Law and Justice’s strategy was to capitalise on Mr Duda’s high 
public profile.43 Although he was careful not to support Law and Justice overtly, the new 
President used the various political and constitutional instruments at his disposal to advance 
the party’s policy agenda. In August, in his first major initiative as President Mr Duda 
proposed holding a referendum on the same day as the parliamentary election on the 
                                                          
35 See: Piotr Gursztyn, ‘Polska dwóch prędkości’, Do Rzeczy, 7-13 September 2015. 
36 See: Radosław Markowski and Michał Kornatowski, ‘Rewolucja mniejszości’, Polityka, 3-9 February 2016. 
37 See: Michał Szułdrzyński, ‘Mało wiarygodne straszenie PiS-em’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 September 2015. 
38 See: Jerzy Baczyński and Mariusz Janicki, ‘Polska dla wkurzonych’, Polityka, 17-23 June 2015. 
39 See: CBOS. Postulaty dotyczące zmian systemowych w Polsce. CBOS: Warsaw. July 2005, pp1-2. 
40  See, for example: Rafał Ziemkiewicz, ‘Konserwatywny bunt’, Do Rzeczy, 9-15 June 2014; Piotr 
Skwieczyński, ‘I korek wystrzelił’, W Sieci, 18-24 May 2015; Andrzej Rychard, ‘Dlatego przegrał 
Komorowski’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 May 2015; and Adam Leszczyński, ‘Młoda Polska prawicowa’, Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 14 November 2015. Cf: Mariusz Janicki, ‘Między buntem a obiadem’, Polityka, 22-28 July 2015. 
41 See: Janusz Majcherek, ‘Po wyborach. Zmiana, wymiana, odmiana’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 October 2015. 
42 See: Andrzej Stankiewicz, ‘Premier zrzuca balast’, Rzeczpospolita, 10 June 2015. 
43 See: Paweł Wroński, ‘Czy prezydent wygra PiS wybory?’ Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 September 2015. 
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government’s unpopular decision to raise the retirement age.44 When the Civic Platform-
dominated Senate - Poland’s second chamber, whose approval was required for referendum 
initiatives - voted down Mr Duda’s proposal he used his right to initiate legislation to submit 
a draft law returning the retirement age to its previous levels.45 Civic Platform knew that it 
could not mount a full frontal assault on a newly elected head of state with a large popular 
mandate but sensed the danger that he represented to the party’s electoral prospects and tried 
to undermine Mr Duda as a ‘partisan President’. In fact, Mr Duda did not enjoy especially 
high popularity ratings compared with other Presidents at the beginning of their terms of 
office;46 perhaps not surprisingly, having been plunged into an election campaign he was 
bound to be perceived as partisan by many Civic Platform supporters. Nonetheless, most 
Poles appeared willing to give Mr Duda the benefit of the doubt and, as Poland’s most trusted 
politician,47 he was still a valuable electoral asset for Law and Justice. 
 
Following the Peasant Party’s disastrous presidential campaign, when its deputy leader Adam 
Jarubas finished sixth with only 1.6% of the vote, Civic Platform’s junior coalition partner 
also struggled in the parliamentary election with a low national media profile and bad 
publicity surrounding a corruption scandal linked to its parliamentary caucus leader Jan 
Bury.48 Meanwhile, driven by fear that none of them would cross the 5% threshold for 
securing parliamentary representation, Poland’s main left-wing parties contested the election 
as part of the ‘United Left’ (Zjednoczona Lewica: ZL), formed as a marriage of convenience 
of its two main components: the Democratic Left Alliance and liberal-left ‘Your Movement’ 
(Twój Ruch: TR), joined by a number of smaller left-wing groupings.49 The once-powerful 
Alliance governed Poland from 1993-97 and 2001-5 but was in the doldrums since its support 
collapsed in the 2005 election50 and in 2011 suffered its worst ever parliamentary election 
defeat slumping to fifth place with only 8.24% of the vote. A series of disappointing mid-
term election results culminated in a disastrous showing in the presidential poll when the 
Alliance’s candidate Magdalena Ogórek finished fifth with a humiliating 2.4%. ‘Your 
Movement’ emerged from the anti-clerical liberal Palikot Movement (Ruch Palikota: RP) 
which was formed in 2010 by Janusz Palikot, a controversial and flamboyant businessman 
and one-time Civic Platform parliamentarian, and came from nowhere to finish third in the 
2011 election with 10.02% of the vote. However, Mr Palikot’s party failed to capitalise on its 
success and Poles grew tired of his erratic behaviour and political zig-zags. Attempting to re-
invent his party, by toning down the strong anti-clericalism and social liberalism on which his 
earlier electoral success was based while placing greater emphasis on free-market economics, 
                                                          
44 Together with two other issues on which millions of Poles had signed petitions calling for referendums but 
which had been ignored by the government: lowering the compulsory school starting age from 7 to 6 and 
restricting the sale of state-owned forest land. See: Mariusz Janicki, ‘Referendum dwa, czyli politycne trzy po 
trzy’, Polityka, 26 August-1 September 2015; and Jan Rokita, ‘Dwa referenda’, W Sieci, 31 August-6 September 
2015. 
45 See: Dominika Wielowiejska, ‘Duda nieczysto gra emerytami’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 September 2015. 
46  See: Piotr Sokołowski, ‘CBOS: 39 proc. dobrze ocenia prezydenta Dude’, 30 September 2015, 
http://www.rp.pl/Kraj/309309865-CBOS-39-proc-dobrze-ocenia-prezydenta-Dude.html (accessed 1 October 
2015). 
47 See: CBOS. Zaufanie do polityków miesiąc przed wyborami parlamentarnymi. CBOS: Warsaw. October 2015. 
48  See: Katarzyna Naszkowska, ‘Najtrudniejsze wybory ludowców od 1989r. PSL bez pomysłu’, Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 11 September 2015; and Marcin Pieńkowski, ‘U ludowców marazm i zastój’, Rzeczpospolita, 6 
October 2015. 
49 See: Marcin Pieńkowski, ‘SLD do wybory pójdzie razem z Palikotem’, Rzeczpospolita, 18 July 2015; and 
Renata Grochal, ‘Zjednoczona lewica, ale bez programu’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 July 2015. 
50 See: Krzysztof Jasiewicz, ‘The (not always sweet) uses of opportunism: Post-communist political parties in 
Poland’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol 41 No 4, December 2008, pp421-442. 
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failed to turn Mr Palikot’s fortunes around and he finished seventh in the presidential election 
with a derisory 1.4%.51  
 
These catastrophic results convinced many of the two left-wing parties’ younger leaders that 
their only hope was to contest the parliamentary election on a united ticket. The United Left’s 
election campaign was moderately successful in containing programmatic and personal 
divisions between Democratic Left Alliance leader Leszek Miller and Mr Palikot, who were 
known for their strong personal antipathy, as it pushed younger activists to the fore. These 
included Your Movement’s media-friendly joint leader Barbara Nowacka who emerged as 
the coalition’s main spokesman. However, Ms Nowacka failed to live up to her initial 
promise and, in a televised leaders’ debate in the week running up to polling day, was 
overshadowed by Adrian Zandberg, a charismatic leader of the new radical left ‘Together’ 
(Razem) party,52 which was formed in May and refused to join the electoral alliance arguing 
that the parties comprising it had discredited the Polish left.53 
 
One event that many expected to play a significant role in the campaign but failed to do so 
was the September referendum on replacing the country’s current list-based proportional 
electoral system with UK-style single-member constituencies (known by the Polish acronym 
‘JOW’: jednomandatowe okręgi wyborcze). Mr Komorowski called the referendum in May 
as a panic move in the run up to the presidential election second round run-off to win over 
supporters of the charismatic rock star and social activist Paweł Kukiz. Running as an 
independent right-wing ‘anti-system’ candidate, Mr Kukiz - for whom electoral reform, 
which he saw as the key to renewing Polish politics, was a signature issue and main focus of 
his earlier social activism - came from nowhere to finish a surprise third and pick up more 
than one-fifth of the first round votes. 54  Opinion polls conducted immediately after the 
presidential election showed Mr Kukiz to be Poland’s most trusted politician and his (then as-
yet-unnamed) grouping running in second place, behind Law and Justice but ahead of Civic 
Platform. However, he squandered this political capital as his grouping, which adopted the 
name ‘Kukiz ‘15’, descended into a series of bitter rows and splits causing its electoral 
support to plummet.55 These blunders overshadowed attempts to mobilise for the referendum 
which was expected to provide Mr Kukiz with a major boost but ended in fiasco with a 
derisory 7.8% turnout.56 Instead, helped by Mr Duda, Law and Justice re-focused debate onto 
the government’s pension reforms by, as noted above, proposing an additional referendum to 
be held on election day. 
 
Although the election campaign was dominated by domestic issues it also coincided with the 
summer build-up of the European migration crisis which emerged as an important question 
dividing Poland’s parties. The issue was a problematic one for the Civic Platform-led 
government given Poles were keen to avoid the kind of cultural and security problems that 
many of them felt West European countries experienced through admitting large numbers of 
                                                          
51 See: Marcin Pieńkowski, ‘Sieroty po Palikocie muszą ułożyć sobie życie no nowo’, Rzeczpospolita, 22 
September 2015. 
52 See: Paweł Wroński, ‘Efekt Zandberga’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 October 2015. 
53 For more on ‘Together’, see: Anna Dąbrowska, ‘Razem, ale osobno’, Polityka, 24-30 June 2015. For a good 
analysis of the weakness of the United Left’s election campaign, see: Rafał Ziemkiewicz, ‘Bez liderów, bez 
programu - bez sensu’, Do Rzeczy, 12-18 October 2015. 
54 See: Marek Cichocki, ‘Paweł Kukiz czyli rokosz w XXI wieku’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 June 2015. 
55 See: Wojciech Wybranowski, ‘Kukiz spada ze sceny’, Do Rzeczy, 31 August-6 September 2015; and Piotr 
Gursztyn, ‘Muzyczna przystawka’, Do Rzeczy, 14-20 September 2015. 
56 See: Wojciech Szacki, ‘Koncertowa wtopa’, Polityka, 9-15 September 2015. 
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Muslim migrants, who were seen as difficult to assimilate and embedding violent extremists 
within their communities. For example, a February 2015 CBOS survey found 44% of Poles 
negatively inclined towards Muslims (the largest proportion of any religious group) and only 
23% positive (33% were indifferent).57 On the other hand, the Kopacz government came 
under growing pressure - both domestically from the liberal-left media and cultural 
establishment, and internationally from Brussels and other EU member states - to participate 
in a Europe-wide burden sharing plan and, as a consequence, eventually agreed to accept 
7,000 migrants over two years as part of the relocation scheme agreed at the September 
European Council meeting.58 Law and Justice argued that this figure was unrealistic because 
family members would be able to join initial arrivals and that it was naïve to believe that it 
would not be used as a precedent to force Poland to take in additional migrants in the future. 
Civic Platform, in turn, argued that it was Poland’s duty to take in people fleeing for their 
lives and argued that the opposition was promoting xenophobia and could lead to the country 
being isolated within the EU. Law and Justice responded by warning that, by accepting large 
number of migrants who did not respect Polish laws and customs, there was a serious danger 
of Poland making the same mistakes as many West European countries and that the EU 
should concentrate on providing aid to refugee camps in the region.59 
 
In fact, the party that focused most on the migration issue was the right-wing Coalition for 
the Renewal of the Republic Freedom and Hope (Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej 
Wolność i Nadzieja: KORWiN). This was the latest project of Janusz Korwin-Mikke, a 
veteran eccentric who had contested every national election since 1989 and was notorious for 
having articulated some of the most controversial views in Polish politics. Mr Korwin-Mikke 
finally achieved success when he was elected to the EP in May 2014 as leader of the 
Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy: KNP) party, which came from 
nowhere to finish fourth with 7.2% of the votes.60 In January 2015 Mr Korwin-Mikke left the 
Congress to form his own party61 but finished fourth in the May presidential poll securing a 
disappointing 3.26%. Although the core of Mr Kowin-Mikke’s political ideology had always 
been radical economic liberalism, social conservatism and Euroscepticism, in this election his 
party’s main campaign theme was opposition to the ‘Islamisation’ of Poland.62 
 
Results 
 
As Table 2 shows, the election saw a stunning victory for Law and Justice which increased its 
share of the vote by 7.69% compared with 2011 from 29.89% to 37.58%, winning 235 seats 
in the 460-member Sejm, making it the first political grouping in post-communist Poland to 
secure an outright parliamentary majority. At the same time, Civic Platform suffered a 
crushing defeat and - although its vote share did not fall below the psychologically important 
20% mark, and it finished well ahead of the other groupings - the party saw its vote share fall 
by 15.09% from 39.18% in 2011 to only 24.09% and number of seats decline from 207 to 
138.  
                                                          
57 See: CBOS. Postawy wobec Islamu i muzułmanów. CBOS: Warsaw. March 2015, pp3-4. See also: Joanna 
Klimowicz, ‘Polacy boją się muzułmanów. Najbardzjiej najmłodsi’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 September 2015. 
58 See: Anna Słojewska, ‘Polska “za”. Przymiemy ok. 7 tys. Uchodźów’, Rzeczpospolita, 22 September 2015. 
59 See: Łukasz Warzecha, ‘Imigranci i Polskie wybory’, W Sieci, 28 September-4 October 2015. 
60 See: Grzegorz Rzeczkowski, ‘Korwinada’, Polityka, 28 May-3 June 2014; and Piotr Skwieciński, ‘Korwin, 
czyli problem PiS’, W Sieci, 2-8 June 2014. 
61 See; Paweł Majewski, ‘KORWiN od zera’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 January 2015. 
62 See: Michalina Mikulska, ‘”Nie” dla imigrantów w spocie partii KORWIN’, Rzeczpospolita, 30 September 
2015. 
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Table 2: October 2015 Polish parliamentary election results to the Sejm 
 
 2011 2015 % 
Change  % Seats % Seats 
Law and Justice (PiS) 29.89 157 37.58 235 +7.6 
Civic Platform (PO) 39.18 207 24.09 138 -15.09 
Kukiz ‘15   8.81 42 +8.81 
Modern (Nowoczesna)   7.60 29 +7.60 
United Left (ZL)* 19.11 67 7.55  -11.56 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 8.36 28 5.13 16 -3.23 
Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic 
Freedom and Hope (KORWiN) 
  4.76  +4.76 
Together (Razem)     3.62  +3.62 
Source: Polish State Electoral Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/) 
*Comprising the Democratic Left Alliance, Your Movement, the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna: PPS), Labour Union (Unia Pracy: UP), Greens (Zieloni) and Polish Labour Party (Polska Partia 
Pracy: PPP). The 2011 figures are the combined votes and seat totals for the Democratic Left Alliance and Your 
Movement. 
 
As Table 3 shows, Law and Justice performed particularly strongly among older (47.1% of 
over-60s) and less well-educated voters (55% of those with only a primary or junior high 
education), those living in rural areas (45.4%), together with workers (45.4%), farmers 
(52.3%), the unemployed (43.1%) and retirees and pensioners (47.7%). However, the party 
actually won the largest share of the vote in virtually every demographic group, including 
those that had previously been Civic Platform bastions of support. These included: younger 
voters (25.8% to Civic Platform’s 14.6%) and students (23.9% to Civic Platform’s 13.2%), 
the better educated (29.1% of those with a higher education to Civic Platform’s 26.8%) and 
those living in larger towns with 200-500,000 inhabitants (31.1% to Civic Platform’s 29.8%) 
and cities with more than half-a-million (30% to Civic Platform’s 28.4%). Indeed, having 
won 55.2% of the vote among 18-19 year old voters and 50.7% of 20-24-year olds in 2007, as 
Table 3 shows in this election Civic Platform actually finished fourth among 18-29 year olds, 
among whom anti-establishment feeling was particularly widespread, behind not only Law 
and Justice but also Kukiz ’15 and Mr Korwin-Mikke’s party. The only occupational groups 
where Civic Platform secured a (bare) plurality of the vote were entrepreneurs (28.8% to Law 
and Justice’s 28%) and directors and managers (28.7% to Law and Justice’s 25.8%).  
 
In recent elections, there was also a clear geographical divide between the two main parties in 
Poland’s ‘historic’ regions: Civic Platform won in the Northern and Western regions, that 
were either part of the so-called ‘recovered territories’ that had been part of Germany before 
the Second World War or had been in the Prussian Empire before the First World War; while 
Law and Justice dominated in the Southern and Eastern regions that were part of the Russian 
and Austro-Hungarian Empires before 1918.63 In this election, however, while the overall 
patterns of support remained broadly the same, Law and Justice actually secured the largest 
share of the vote in 14 out of 16 regions; Civic Platform was only able to win a plurality of 
votes in Pomerania and Western Pomerania.64 
                                                          
63 See, for example: Krzysztof Jasiewicz, ‘“The Past Is Never Dead”: Identity, Class, and Voting Behaviour in 
Contemporary Poland’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol 23 No 4, October 2009, pp491-508. 
64 See: Wojciech Szacki, ‘Całkiem inna mapa’, Polityka, 28 October-2 November 2015. 
16 
 
Table 3: Voting profile of party supporters in the October 2015 Polish parliamentary election 
(%) 
 
 
 Law and 
Justice 
Civic 
Platform 
Kukiz 
‘15 
Modern United 
Left 
Polish 
Peasant 
Party 
KORWiN Together 
Voting by age 
18-29 25.8 14.6 19.9 8.5 3.9 3.8 16.8 5.2 
30-39 29.5 24.1 12.1 11.6 6.4 5.0 4.7 5.7 
40-49 37.2 25.9 7.4 8.9 7.4 6.0 2.6 4.0 
50-59 45.6 23.3 4.7 6.4 8.3 6.2 1.8 3.2 
60+ 47.1 28.2 2.0 4.1 10.5 5.0 0.6 1.9 
Voting by education 
Primary/junior high 55.0 15.4 6.7 2.0 4.2 6.7 6.5 2.3 
Basic vocational 51.6 19.7 7.4 2.4 6.1 7.1 2.4 2.5 
Middle/college 37.9 23.2 10.0 5.6 8.0 5.2 5.6 3.6 
Baccalaureate/higher 29.1 26.8 8.2 12.9 8.1 4.1 5.1 5.0 
Voting by place of residence 
Villages 45.4 17.5 9.2 4.9 5.3 9.4 4.4 2.9 
<50,000 36.0 25.6 9.2 7.0 7.9 4.6 5.2 3.7 
50-200,000 34.7 25.4 9.9 7.9 9.0 3.0 5.0 4.2 
200-500,000 31.1 29.8 8.0 9.6 9.7 1.5 5.6 4.1 
500,000+ 30.0 28.4 5.9 14.0 8.8 1.4 5.1 6.1 
Voting by occupation 
Entrepreneurs 28.0 28.8 9.1 14.9 5.5 3.8 5.8 3.3 
Directors/managers 25.8 28.7 7.8 16.0 7.3 3.8 5.1 5.0 
Administration/services 34.0 24.8 9.2 8.1 8.2 5.2 4.1 5.7 
Farmers 52.3 10.9 6.4 1.7 4.6 18.6 2.6 2.0 
Workers 45.4 17.3 12.7 3.5 6.0 5.5 4.9 3.6 
Students 23.9 13.2 20.2 7.3 4.1 2.9 21.3 5.5 
Unemployed 43.1 19.3 12.3 4.6 6.3 4.7 4.8 3.7 
Retirees/pensioners 47.7 28.0 2.4 3.6 10.6 4.6 0.6 1.9 
Voting by 2011 party 
Civic Platform 10.4 51.4 6.1 14.1 7.0 3.4 2.3 4.7 
Law and Justice 89.4 1.2 4.3 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.7 0.8 
Palikot Movement 9.1 6.8 23.4 12.6 16.6 2.2 15.1 12.5 
Polish Peasant Party 20.0 6.0 5.3 2.5 4.6 57.0 1.6 2.6 
Democratic Left Alliance 7.0 8.8 4.9 3.9 64.6 3.9 1.5 5.0 
Did not vote 26.0 11.2 22.0 7.5 5.4 4.2 16.3 5.7 
         
Actual 37.58 24.09 8.81 7.60 7.55 5.13 4.76 3.62 
Source: Wyborcza.pl. Wybory 2015. Polska młodzież prawicowa: 66 proc. głosów uczniów i studentów poszło 
na PiS, Kukiza i Korwina, 26 October 2015 (http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,19087837,wybory-2015-polska-
mlodziez-prawicowa-66-proc-glosow-uczniow.html#ixzz48uILbngp) (accessed 26 October 2015). 
 
The other major development was the emergence of two new political groupings that were 
able to cross the 5% threshold. Mr Kukiz turned out to have enough of a hard core of 
supporters immune to the kind of gaffes that would have been fatal for more mainstream 
politicians and were willing to support him as long as he remained a credible fighter against 
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‘the system’ and, as Table 2 shows, Kukiz ‘15 finished as the third largest grouping in the 
new parliament winning 8.81% of the vote and 42 seats. As Table 3 shows, as well securing 
19.9% of the vote among younger voters and 20.2% among students, Kukiz ’15 picked up 
22% of those who did not vote in the previous parliamentary election. It also won the support 
of 23.4% of those who had supported Mr Palikot’s party in 2011, more than the number who 
voted for the United Left (16.6%), in spite of the fact that Mr Kukiz’s grouping was widely 
recognised as being located on the ‘anti-system’ right.  
 
The other newcomer was the liberal ‘Modern’ (Nowoczesna) grouping, formed in May 2015 
by economist Ryszard Petru. Mr Petru’s party steadily consolidated its support by advocating 
policies such as a ‘flat tax’ of 16% which appealed to voters attracted by the free market 
philosophy with which Civic Platform was originally associated, but who felt that the ruling 
party had drifted away from its roots and turned to Mr Petru’s grouping as a more credible 
liberal alternative.65 Although Mr Petru lacked Mr Kukiz’s charisma, and the party’s social 
base was relatively narrow, as Table 2 shows ‘Modern’ secured enough support from what 
should have been Civic Platform’s natural electorate among the younger, well-educated and 
better-off urban voters and entrepreneurs for it to cross the threshold, winning 7.6% of the 
vote and 28 seats. As Table 3 shows, Mr Petru’s party picked up the support of 14.1% of 
Civic Platform’s 2011 voters, together with 12.6% of those who had voted for Mr Palikot. It 
also secured 12.9% among voters with a higher education, 14% of those living in cities with 
more than 500,000 inhabitants, 14.9% of entrepreneurs, and 16% of directors and managers. 
 
On the other hand, while United Left’s leaders were hoping for a sizeable ‘unity premium’, 
the grouping lacked its component parties’ name recognition and struggled to develop a 
distinctive appeal.66  As Table 2 shows, it failed to cross the 8% threshold for electoral 
coalitions, securing only 7.55%, which meant that, for the first time in any post-1989 
election, no left-wing parties were represented in the Polish parliament. As Table 3 shows, 
although United Left was able to retain 64.6% of Democratic Left Alliance voters, only 
16.6% of those who supported Mr Palikot in 2011 voted for it and its strongest support was to 
be found among older voters and retirees and pensioners, suggesting that its core vote 
comprised those with links to the former communist regime.  
 
At the same time, as Table 2 shows ‘Together’ secured 3.62% of the vote, not enough to 
obtain parliamentary representation but qualifying the party for state funding and peeling 
away sufficient support to prevent the United Left from crossing the 8% threshold. As Table 
3 shows, Together’s support was spread fairly evenly across different socio-demographic 
groups, although tended to be skewed somewhat towards: younger, better-educated voters 
living in urban areas, students, those working in administration and services, and (ironically 
for a radical left grouping) directors and managers. Although it only picked up 5% of 
Democratic Left Alliance 2011 voters, 12.5% of Mr Palikot’s supporters voted for the party. 
 
As Table 2 shows, the only other grouping to secure parliamentary representation was the 
Peasant Party which just scraped over the threshold securing 5.13%, its worst result in any 
post-1989 election. It was also the victim of the anti-incumbent backlash that was the main 
leitmotif of the election, and blamed specifically for failing to prevent the government’s 
                                                          
65 See: Wojciech Szacki, ‘Taka lepsza Platforma’, Polityka, 10-16 June 2015; Witold Gadomski, ‘Nowoczesna 
Ryszarda Petru jak młode PO’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 September 2015; and Kamila Baranowska, ‘Nowoczesna 
PO’, Do Rzeczy, 21-27 September 2015. 
66 See: Kamila Baranowska, ‘I po lewicy’, Do Rzeczy, 2-8 November 2015. 
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perceived neglect of rural areas and the agricultural sector. As Table 3 shows, not only did 
Mr Piechociński not deliver on his pledge to broaden out its socio-demographic base, the 
party even failed to hold on to much of its previous core electorate: securing support from 
only 18.6% of farmers and 9.4% of voters living in rural areas, compared with 52.3% and 
45.4% respectively for Law and Justice; and only held on to 57% of its 2011 voters (20% of 
them switched to Mr Kaczyński’s party). 
 
Finally, as Table 2 shows Mr Korwin-Mikke’s party fell just short of the threshold with 
4.76% of the vote. While it hoped to steal Mr Kukiz’s thunder and emerge as the main ‘anti-
system’ grouping on the back of opposition to mass Muslim migration, Law and Justice’s 
tough stance limited Mr Korwin-Mikke’s scope to mobilise around this issue. Nonetheless, as 
Table 3 shows, it secured 16.8% of the vote among younger voters, 21.3% among students 
(compared with only 0.6% among the over-60s and retirees and pensioners), 16.3% among 
those who did not vote in 2011 and 15.1% of 2011 Palikot Movement voters.  
 
The (beginning of the) end of the ‘post-transition’ divide? 
 
So what does this election tell us about the long-term trajectory of the Polish party system 
and what implications does it have for the ‘post-transition divide’ based on the Civic 
Platform-Law and Justice duopoly that dominated it for the last decade? Writing in the 1990s 
at onset of competitive politics in Eastern Europe, Mair foresaw that post-communist party 
systems in countries like Poland would differ substantially from those in the more established 
West European democracies in a number of ways, all of which were likely to produce greater 
instability.67 The absence of strong cleavage structures and the impact of this on the nature of 
the electorate would, he argued, lead to continued flux (and possibly fragmentation) in the 
format of the newly emerging party systems. Similarly, the context of competition was one in 
which political elites were more likely to have little organisational loyalty and there were 
even strong institutional incentives to instability. These included: a lack of developed 
institutional structures, institutional uncertainties and relatively open structures of 
competition. The obstacles that arose in the post-communist environment were such that, 
according to Mair, their party systems were likely to have considerable problems in settling 
down and might never become consolidated. 
 
Since then, a substantial literature had emerged on the questions of post-communist party 
system (in)stability and (lack of) institutionalisation and, while there is disagreement about its 
extent and the direction of change, most accounts have found few signs of consolidation. 
Comparing the region with Western democracies, commentators have pointed to: continuing 
higher levels of electoral volatility and more fragmented, fluid and unstable party systems, 
together with lower levels of party attachment that could provide the basis for stable cleavage 
development.68 Indeed there were question marks as to whether it was possible to identify 
                                                          
67 See: Peter Mair. Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1997, 
pp175-198. 
68  See, for example: Jack Bielasiak, ‘Party Competition in Emerging Democracies: Representation and 
Effectiveness in Post-communism and Beyond’, Democratisation, Vol 12 No 3, June 2005, pp331-356; Margit 
Tavits, ‘Party systems in the making: the emergence and success of new parties in new democracies’, American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol 49 No 2, April 2005, pp283-298; Scott Mainwaring and Edurne Zoco, 
‘Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New 
Democracies’, Party Politics, Vol 13 No 2, March 2007, pp155-178; Russell J. Dalton and Steven Weldon, 
‘Partisanship and party system institutionalisation’, Party Politics, Vol 13 No 2, March 2007, pp176-196; Jan-
Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, ‘Party System Instability in Europe: Persistent Differences in Volatility between 
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‘party systems’, where the formal conditions of ‘system-ness’ (party stability and institutional 
survival) exist, at all. As Lewis put it writing in 2011: ‘There is little evidence to suggest that 
institutionalisation has made much headway in the region overall in the past two decades’.69  
 
However, as noted above, in Poland the ‘post-transition divide’ which emerged in 2005 not 
only endured but strengthened, going on to dominate and structure a party system which 
seemed to be consolidating around this bi-polarity. In addition to the increasing combined 
share of the vote and seats won by these two parties shown in Table 1, this could also be seen 
in a substantial fall in the level of aggregate electoral volatility (calculated according to the 
‘Pederson index’) from 24.6% in 2007 (and a massive 49.3% in 2001) to only 13.5% in 
2011.70 In fact, the Civic Platform-Law and Justice duopoly actually emerged conjuncturally 
- indeed, almost accidentally - and originally the socio-demographic profiles of the two party 
electorates (and, arguably, many of their policies) were actually very similar;71 indeed, in 
2005 they were seen as natural coalition partners. However, as the divisions between the two 
party elites widened and deepened, so did the differences between their electorates. They also 
started to map increasingly onto distinctive and clearly defined socio-demographic 
constituencies reflecting deeper ideological and cultural divisions within Polish society; in 
other words, the two sides of the ‘post-transition divide’. Law and Justice voters were older, 
more rural and religious, and less well-educated, while Civic Platform supporters were 
younger, more urban, better off, better educated, and more secular. 72  Indeed, the deep 
political polarisation and bitterness that characterised the two parties’ on-going rivalry meant 
that they became constant points of reference for each other, with the existence of (and 
repellence from) the other being at the heart of their respective political appeals. 
 
An important factor that appeared to encourage party system consolidation and stabilisation 
was the Polish state party funding regime that was established in 2001.73 Since then the state 
became the largest source of income for the main parties at a time when political 
campaigning was increasingly professionalised, and therefore costly. This development 
clearly favoured the larger ‘insider’ parties such as Civic Platform and Law and Justice while 
discriminating against smaller non-parliamentary groupings, potentially blocking the 
emergence of new entrants and making it increasingly difficult for them to challenge this 
duopoly. For example, in 2012-15 the annual subventions paid to the main parties were: 17.8 
million złoties for Civic Platform and 16.5 million for Law and Justice compared with 7.5 
million for the Palikot (later ‘Your’) Movement, 6.4 million for the Peasant Party, and 6.3 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
West and East?’ Democratization, Vol 14 No 1, February 2007, pp92-110; and Margit Tavits, ‘On the linkage 
between electoral volatility and party system instability in Central and Eastern Europe’, European Journal of 
Political Research, Vol 47 No 5, August 2008, pp537-555. 
69  See: Paul G. Lewis, ‘Introduction: Europeanising party politics? Central and Eastern Europe after EU 
enlargement,’ in Paul G. Lewis and Radosław Markowski, eds, Europeanising party politics? Comparative 
perspectives on central and Eastern Europe. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. 2011, 
pp1-24 (8). 
70 See: ‘The 2007 Polish Parliamentary Election’, p1059. The 2011 figure is based on the author’s calculations. 
However, this remained high by comparative European standards: the average level of aggregative volatility in 
West European elections between 1960-89 was 8.4%. See: Party System Change, p182. 
71 See: ‘Poland’s Unexpected Political Earthquake’, p52. 
72 See: ‘The 2007 Polish Parliamentary Election’. Jasiewicz identified the two parties’ supporters at opposite 
ends of a ‘solidarism-liberalism’ continuum which pitted ‘market friendly and inclusive liberals…against the 
redistributionist populists’. See: ‘“The Past Is Never Dead”’, p506. 
73 See: Jarosław Zbieranek, ‘The system of financing political parties in Poland - experience and challenges’, in 
Jacek Kucharczyk and Jarosław Zbieranek, eds. Democracy in Poland 1989-2009: Challenges for the Future. 
ISP: Warsaw, 2010, pp77-87. 
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million for the Democratic Left Alliance. The estimates for what the parties that were eligible 
for subventions following the 2015 election would receive between 2016-19 were: 18.5 
million per annum for Law and Justice and 15.5 million for Civic Platform compared with 
6.2 million for ‘Modern’ and 4.5 million for the Peasant Party. Of those political groupings 
who failed to enter parliament but crossed the 3% threshold for subventions the parties 
comprising the United Left would receive 6.2 million per annum, Mr Korwin-Mikke’s party 
4.2 million and ‘Together’ 3.2 million.74 
 
However, although the 2015 election saw the Law and Justice-Civic Platform duopoly once 
again dominating the Polish party system, there were also some indications of greater fluidity 
and instability which suggested that the dominance of the ‘post-transition divide’ may have 
peaked and even be in decline. Firstly, the election saw a substantial increase in the level of 
aggregate electoral volatility from 13.5% in 2011 to 33%. As Table 1 shows, this was partly 
due to a fall in the combined share of the vote won by the two largest parties to only 61.67% 
compared with 69.07% in 2011 and 73.62% in 2007.75 The latter was, of course, largely 
accounted for by Civic Platform’s more than 15% drop in support. 
 
The main reason why the Polish party system remained brittle, potentially unstable and 
vulnerable to implosion was the low level of party institutionalisation and weak links 
between parties and their supporters. As Table 4 shows, and this election once again 
confirmed, electoral turnout in Polish parliamentary elections remained extremely low, with 
barely half of registered voters participating in the 2015 ballot (50.92%), and only three out 
of Poland’s eight post-1989 parliamentary polls have seen a turnout of more 50%. For sure, 
research has shown that Polish non-voters were not a static body and, except for a hard core, 
moved in and out of voting,76 but this underlying instability suggested that the electorate 
remained relatively ‘open’ and available to potential challenger groupings.  
 
According to a 2011-13 survey of 18 countries Poland had the lowest levels of party 
membership, at only 0.79% as a percentage of the electorate (241,544) compared with an 
average of 3.45%; and this figure had actually fallen from 1.15% at the end of the 1990s.77 
This stemmed partly from the fact that Polish parties had made few attempts to develop 
organic links with and ‘encapsulate’ their supporters but it was also because Poles had 
extremely negative attitudes towards parties so that even if party strategists actively sought to 
                                                          
74 See: PKW. Informacja o przewidywanej rocznej wysokości subwencji przysługującej partiom politycznym w 
związku z wyborami do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej przeprowadzonymi w dniu 25 października 2015 r.,  
http://pkw.gov.pl/464_Subwencja_z_budzetu_panstwa/1/3371_Informacja_o_przewidywanej_wysokosci_subw
encji_na_dzialalnosc_statutowa_przyslugujacych_partiom_politycznym_w_latach_2016-2019 (accessed 5 May 
2016). Even though it secured parliamentary representation, Kukiz ’15 was not eligible for state subventions as 
it did not register as a political party and contested the election as a ‘civic committee of voters’.  
75 Although this was still higher than in any of the other five post-1989 elections and, as Table 1 shows, the 
share of the seats won by these two parties actually increased slightly to 81.09%, after 81.52% in 2007 the 
second highest level since 1989. 
76  See: Mikołaj Cześnik, Paweł Grzelak and Michał Kotnarowski, ‘Chwiejni versus kapryśni - 
niestabilnośćzachowan wyborczych w Polsce’, Studia Polityczne, Vol 21, 2011, pp61–86. 
77 See: Thomas Poguntke et al, ‘Party Rules, Party Resources, and the Politics of Parliamentary Democracies: 
How Parties Organize in the 21st Century’, unpublished manuscript, 2015. 2012 World Values Survey data for 
Poland actually found that 4.2% of respondents said that they were members of political parties but it also found 
that the number of ‘active’ members was only 1.1%. Given that the latter figure was in line with previous 
surveys this was more likely to be the accurate one. See: World Values Survey, World Values Survey (2010-
2014) – Poland 2012, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp (accessed 9 February 
2016). 
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recruit substantially more members their prospects for success would have been slim. For 
example, a July 2013 CBOS survey found that 69% of respondents felt there was no party 
that they could vote for with full conviction while only 26% said that there was.78 Similarly, 
the 2014 European Social Survey found that only 8.5% of Polish respondents indicated that 
they trusted political parties.79 A February/March 2014 CBOS survey also found that only 
17% of respondents said that they trusted political parties, the lowest level of any Polish 
institution, while 66% did not,80 and only 30% identified with a political party down from 
57% in 1998. 81  All of this suggested that Polish parties had not succeeded in rooting 
themselves solidly in the electorate and, if anything, party identification had actually fallen in 
recent years. 
 
Table 4: Turnout in post-1989 Polish elections (%) 
 
 Presidential Parliamentary 
1990 60.63(1) 
53.40(2) 
 
1991  43.20 
1993  52.13 
1995 64.70(1) 
68.23(2) 
 
1997  47.93 
2000 61.12  
2001  46.29 
2005 49.74(1) 
50.99(2) 
40.57 
2007  53.88 
2010 54.94(1) 
55.31(2) 
 
2011  48.92 
2015 48.96 (1) 
55.34 (2) 
50.92 
Source: ‘15 chętnych na jeden mandate,’ Rzeczpospolita, 8-9 October 2011; and Polish State Electoral 
Commission (http://www.pkw.gov.pl/) 
 
Moreover, while the Polish state party funding regime certainly discriminated in favour of the 
existing parties, as this election showed this did not mean that there was no scope for new 
party system entrants. Indeed, the breakthrough of Kukiz ’15 and ‘Modern’, together with the 
narrow failure of Mr Korwin-Mikke’s new party to enter parliament and Together’s success 
in crossing the 3% state party funding threshold, showed how challenger parties could 
emerge regardless of the barriers (although, as the earlier short-lived success of the Palikot 
Movement showed, whether and for how long such challengers could sustain this was another 
matter). In this election, Kukiz ’15 was able to enter parliament as the third largest party 
having spent only 2.9 million złoties on its campaign, and while Mr Petru’s party spent a 
                                                          
78 See: CBOS. Jakiej partii potrzebują Polacy. CBOS: Warsaw. September 2013, pp1-2. 
79  Based on a scale of 0-10, with 6-10 indicating that they trusted parties. See: European Social Survey, 
European Social Survey Round 7 2014, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/ (accessed 9 February 2016). 
80 See: CBOS. Stosunek to institucji państwa oraz partii politycznych po 25 latach. CBOS: Warsaw. May 2014, 
p2. 
81 See: Ibid, p7. 
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larger sum of 11.6 million this paled in comparison with the 29.7 million and 29.4 million 
spent by Law and Justice and Civic Platform respectively.82 
 
The 2015 election results highlighted three main areas of potential instability and change in 
the Polish party system. Firstly, in terms of the continued dominance of the Law and Justice-
Civic Platform duopoly and its basis for the ‘post-transition divide’, a huge question mark 
hung over the future of the former ruling party. As Table 3 shows, the scale of Civic 
Platform’s collapse could be seen in the fact that it lost to Law and Justice in almost every 
regional and demographic category, including those where it had once been dominant, with 
its collapse in support among younger voters being particularly striking. For sure, Civic 
Platform’s slump was not as catastrophic as some earlier incumbent parties: Solidarity 
Electoral Action fell from 33.8% in 1997 to only 5.6% in 2001, while the Democratic Left 
Alliance went down from 41% in 2001 to 11.3% in 2005. Nonetheless, electoral defeat meant 
that what had become a deeply divided and factionalised party faced a major, possibly even 
existential, post-election crisis. Moreover, while Civic Platform encompassed a fairly broad 
spectrum of views, its ideological underpinnings were very weak with its most serious 
internal divisions revolving around personality-based factions rather than programmatic 
currents.83 Initially, the party attempted to profile itself as representing a modernising form of 
pro-market, right-wing liberalism and subsequently incorporated a moderate form of social 
conservatism, and even some national-patriotic themes. However, as noted above, 
particularly after it took office in 2007, Civic Platform adopted a deliberate strategy of 
diluting its ideological profile, downplaying its economic liberalism and social conservatism 
and projecting itself as a somewhat amorphous modernising, centrist and pro-European 
‘catch-all’ party in opposition to the forces of provincial nationalism apparently represented 
by Law and Justice. 
 
Law and Justice, on the other hand, was much more successful at developing an integrative 
ideological narrative, initially focused on the so-called ‘Fourth Republic’ project of moral 
and political renewal. The party proceeded to abandon explicit references to the Fourth 
Republic and, as noted above, in this election focused more on socio-economic issues. 
However, the need for the radical reconstruction of the Polish state remained at the heart of a 
powerful conservative-national project that provided the party with a sense of cohesion and 
purpose and bound it closely to its core voters. This link was re-inforced strongly by the 
Smoleńsk tragedy which, together with the concomitant portrayal of Lech Kaczyński as a 
national martyr, became a touchstone issue for Law and Justice through which it could build 
even stronger emotional ties with its supporters. In Civic Platform, on the other hand, 
national and local elites were bound to the party primarily by the access that it gave them to 
state patronage which did not provide a firm basis for more enduring, long-term 
organisational stability and made it vulnerable to eventual implosion if it were to face a really 
serious crisis.84  
                                                          
82 See: PKW. Komunikat Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 15 lutego 2016 r. w sprawie sprawozdań 
finansowych komitetów wyborczych uczestniczących w wyborach do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i do 
Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, przeprowadzonych w dniu 25 października 2015 r., 15 February 2016, 
http://pkw.gov.pl/394_Wybory_do_Sejmu_RP_i_do_Senatu_RP_-
_2015/1/6911_Komunikat_Panstwowej_Komisji_Wyborczej_z_dnia_15_lutego_2016_r_w_sprawie_sprawozda
n_finansowych_komitetow_wyborczych_uczestniczacych_w_wyborach_do_Sejmu_Rzeczypospolitej_Polskiej_
i_do_Senatu_Rzeczypospolitej_Polskiej_przeprowadzonych_w_dniu_25_pazdziernika_2015_r (accessed 5 May 
2016). The Peasant Party spent 13.1 million złoties. 
83 See, for example: Cezary Michalski, ‘Szable premiera’, Polityka, 12-18 February 2014. 
84 See: Marek Migalski, ‘Koniec mitu wielkiej Platformy’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 October 2015. 
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The second source of change in the Polish party system that this election revealed was the 
emergence of new ‘anti-system’ and liberal political forces, namely: Kukiz 15 and ‘Modern’. 
Although it won a larger share of the vote and seats than Mr Petru’s party, of the two it was 
Kukiz ’15 that appeared to have the less promising long-term prospects, and there were 
serious question marks over its future survival. Mr Kukiz’s extremely eclectic candidates list 
produced a potentially unstable parliamentary caucus that was liable to fragment as soon as it 
was forced to confront issues that brought its ideological incoherence to the fore. Moreover, 
having fallen out with and publicly attacked many of the local government and civic activists 
who formed the backbone of his presidential campaign, Mr Kukiz came to rely increasingly 
upon the grassroots organisational support of small radical right-wing parties, 85  whose 
deputies were liable to break away and form separate parliamentary groupings, while others 
were potential defectors to potentially all the other caucuses represented in the Sejm. 
 
On the other hand, ‘Modern’ was a potentially serious challenger for the remainder of Civic 
Platform’s core liberal (and, possibly, wider anti-Law and Justice centrist) electorate. While 
Mr Petru was not a hugely charismatic figure, he was a reasonably effective media performer 
and his small parliamentary caucus contained some articulate and competent members. 
Moreover, although Mr Petru was active on the political scene for several years, the party’s 
greatest potential asset was its ‘newness’, which stood in sharp contrast to the more 
compromised figures associated with Civic Platform. However, ‘Modern’s’ biggest weakness 
was the relative narrowness of its programmatic appeal: while its liberal socio-economic 
policies peeled away disenchanted Civic Platform core voters in the parliamentary election 
they were unpopular with the majority of voters. The same was true of Mr Petru’s links with 
the large banking corporations which, for many Poles, symbolised the hated political-
business nexus (often referred to disparagingly as ‘banksters’) that motivated many of them 
to vote for anti-establishment parties like Law and Justice and Kukiz ’15. 
 
In addition to the existential struggle that the Peasant Party faced against the challenge from 
Law and Justice for what was left of its core rural-agricultural electorate, the third major 
source of party system uncertainty was on the left which, following its electoral catastrophe, 
faced a period of prolonged marginalisation and soul searching. Its main electoral-strategic 
challenge was the fact that while various surveys put the number of Poles who identified 
themselves as left-wing at around 15%,86  centre-left parties had struggled to develop an 
appeal that could bring together socially liberal and economically leftist voters, the two main 
bases of support that formed the core electorates of most European left-wing parties. The 
kind of socially liberal voters who tended to be younger and better-off, prioritised moral-
cultural issues (and in Western Europe inclined naturally towards the political left), in Poland 
were often quite economically liberal. The economically leftist electorate, on the other hand, 
tended to be older, more culturally conservative and inclined to vote for parties of the 
traditionalist right with a leftist economic appeal, such as Law and Justice.87 An April-May 
2015 CBOS survey, for example, found that while most Poles supported leftist socio-
economic policies such as high levels of social welfare, progressive taxation, employment 
                                                          
85  See: Jacek Harłukowicz, ‘Miszmasz na listach Kukiza: narodowcy, ziobryści, Samoobrona’, Gazeta 
Wyborcza, 17 September 2015. 
86 See, for example: CBOS. Zainteresowanie polityką i poglądy polityczne w latach 1989-2015. Deklaracja 
ludzi młodych na tle ogołu badanych. CBOS: Warsaw. October 2015, p6. 
87 See: Antoni Dudek, ‘Lewica w potraszku’, Do Rzeczy, 21-27 July 2014; and Ernest Skalski, ‘Sorry, lewico, 
taki mamy klimat’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 May 2015. 
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protection and state ownership, slightly fewer left-wing self-identifiers favoured these 
policies than did the average (or, indeed, centrist and even right-wing) voter. It was attitudes 
towards European integration and moral-cultural issues - such as abortion, Church-state 
relations and same-sex civil unions - that were the strongest determinants of left-wing self-
placement.88 Interestingly, an October 2015 CBOS survey found that the largest number of 
left-wing self-identifiers planned to vote for Civic Platform (27%) compared with 12% who 
opted for the United Left; only slightly more than the number who chose Law and Justice 
(10%).89 
 
Conclusions 
 
The October 2015 Polish parliamentary election saw a stunning victory for the Law and 
Justice party, which became the first political grouping in post-communist Poland to secure 
an outright parliamentary majority, and equally crushing defeat for the incumbent Civic 
Platform. In addition to the fact that the outgoing ruling party could no longer rely on its 
previously highly successful strategy of mobilising passive anti-Law and Justice voters 
through invoking the ‘politics of fear’, the main factor accounting for the right-wing 
opposition’s success was widespread disillusionment with the country’s ruling elite together 
with a strong prevailing mood that it was time for change. A key element of this was 
scepticism towards the outgoing government’s triumphalist rhetoric about its apparent 
achievements and the broader success of post-communist transition among many Poles, 
especially younger ones, living beyond the large urban centres who were frustrated not to 
have shared in this. Although the election campaign was largely dominated by domestic 
themes it also coincided with the European migration crisis which emerged as an important 
secondary issue providing a boost for Law and Justice. 
 
The Law and Justice-Civic Platform duopoly continued to dominate the Polish party system 
and the overall skewing of the geographical and social bases of party support remained 
broadly the same. However, Law and Justice actually secured the largest share of the vote in 
virtually every demographic group, including those which had traditionally been bastions of 
support for Civic Platform. There were also some indications of greater party system fluidity 
and instability which suggested that this duopoly’s dominance was not as striking as before 
and that Poland might be entering a period of (at least partial) re-alignment. Following its 
collapse in support, Civic Platform faced a major, possibly existential, post-election crisis. In 
recent years the party diluted its ideological underpinnings to the extent that many 
commentators dismissed it as a ‘post-political’ party of power to which its national and local 
elites were bound largely by access to state patronage. This was not a firm basis for more 
enduring, long-term organisational stability and made the party vulnerable to implosion. Law 
and Justice, on the other hand, was much more successful at developing an integrative 
narrative, initially focused on the so-called ‘Fourth Republic’ idea which, while downplayed 
rhetorically, remained at the core a powerful conservative-national project of moral and 
political renewal and radical re-construction of the Polish state. This provided the party with 
a sense of cohesion and purpose that bound it closely to its core voters; a link re-inforced 
strongly by the Smoleńsk trajectory which acted as a touchstone issue for party supporters.  
 
                                                          
88 See: CBOS. Co różni zwolenników lewicy, centrum i prawicy. CBOS: Warsaw. October 2015. 
89 See: Zainteresowanie polityką i poglądy polityczne w latach 1989-2015, p12. 
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Following an election in which, for the first time, no parties representing this current were 
represented in parliament, the marginalised Polish left faced a formidable electoral-strategic 
challenge to develop an appeal that could bring together socially liberal and economically 
leftist voters. At the same time, the election saw the emergence of new political forces, 
namely: the Kukiz ‘15 and ‘Modern’ groupings. Mr Kukiz had a hard core of supporters 
willing to support him as long as he remained a credible fighter against ‘the system’, but 
there were doubts over this grouping’s future survival. ‘Modern’, on the other hand, appeared 
a potentially serious challenger for both the remainder of Civic Platform’s core supporters 
and the broader, more centrist anti-Law and Justice electorate. So while the ‘post-transition 
divide’ could continue to dominate and structure the party system in terms of the ideological 
and cultural divisions and socio-demographic constituencies that the two sides represented, 
there were question marks over who would emerge as the main representative of the anti-Law 
and Justice side of this divide. 
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